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Abstract
The majority has supported gun control policies in the U.S. for decades, but these policies
have stayed unimplemented. While much progress has been made on research of this “gun
control paradox” at the federal level, determining whether this dynamic towards gun control
persists amongst state governments has seen next to none. Previously, this was due to lack of
polling data to estimate public opinion among state populations. However, today, new resources
have become available that allow for reliable estimates to be made. This study uses the
disaggregation of national polling data on gun control from the past decade to determine the
congruence and responsiveness of six state governments to gun control. This research finds
evidence that suggests that the gun control paradox exists in many U.S. states due to a majority
of the researched states displaying low congruence and responsiveness.
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Introduction
Guns have had a huge impact on American life. The U.S. has an enormous number of
guns, by far the highest per capita of any nation (Karp 2018). It also has a higher rate of gun
deaths than any other developed nation, and hosts a plurality of mass shootings in the world,
accounting for just under a third of global mass shootings from 1966-2012 (Lankford 2016, 2;
Grinshteyn and Hemenway 2016, 268–69). The regulation of firearms, or gun control, as a result
is a highly salient and volatile political issue in the United States. For over half a century, the
issue has been an ongoing topic for political debates, campaigns, speeches, bills, and court cases.
One concerning dynamic with gun control is that the government seems unresponsive to public
opinion on it, since national support for stricter gun control policies in the country has stayed
consistently high, while the nation’s gun laws remain incredibly relaxed. The fact that public
opinion is not reflected in national gun laws is concerning because it seemingly violates core
democratic principles. Scholars have labeled this seeming contradiction the “gun control
paradox,” and much research has been done to explain the phenomenon on the national level.
However, the story of gun control politics at the state level differs from that of national
arena. The laws governing firearms vary immensely by state, ranging from having minimal
restrictions to many. Texas, for example, lacks assault weapons restrictions, universal
background checks, or magazine restrictions, while California has implemented all these policies
(see Table A). Additionally, there are considerable regional differences in public opinion on
guns, since some states’ citizens favor stricter gun regulation policies while other states’ citizens
do not. This set of circumstances begs the question: Does the national gun control paradox
characterize the relationship between state firearm regulations and public opinion or do state
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laws and state public opinion align more harmoniously? More simply, does a “gun control
paradox” exist at the level of state governments?
This question warrants investigation for several reasons. For one, while evidence has
found that there is a deficit in the congruence of policy to public opinion in state governments,
state responsiveness to gun control has not been thoroughly investigated (Lax and Phillips 2012,
164–65). Second, investigating if the gun control paradox exists in the states can shed light the
broader issues and dynamics of state government responsiveness. If a disconnect between public
opinion and gun control does exist for gun control in the states, it would warrant further research
to test for its specific causes. The most important reason, however, is that new methods have
been developed and new resources have been made available that allow for the acquisition of
opinion estimates from states on the issue of gun control which was previously unattainable.
To test for state paradoxes, this study measures the level of public support for five
specific gun control policy proposals as well as general support for stricter gun control measures
in six U.S. states. This data was obtained from years of national polls from the Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research (https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/) and separated by state. Each state’s
level of support is compared with the status of the policy’s implementation in the state. To
ascertain general gun control support, the study compares changes in levels of support with
change in gun law grade for each state’s gun policy measured by Giffords Law Center
(https://giffords.org/lawcenter/). Through this methodology, this study finds evidence that the
gun control paradox exists in the states, as a majority of the state governments researched were
incongruent to public opinion on gun control policy and unresponsive to changes in that opinion.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a review on the relevant
literature to the study. This starts with a definition and distinction of the concepts of
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responsiveness and congruence, which are central to studies on linkages between opinion and
policy. Once this distinction is established, the review examines research on the nature of the
opinion-policy link nationally and research on the national gun control paradox. Next, the
literature on state-level gun control politics is considered, reporting how prior research has
measured the responsiveness and congruence of state governments to demonstrate why a more
comprehensive investigation of state gun control paradoxes is necessary. Once the literature
review is complete, the paper discusses the methodology used for the study and then presents its
results. The conclusion section analyzes the data with regard to state government’s
responsiveness to public opinion on the issue of gun control and is rounded off with suggestions
for further research on this topic.
Relevant Literature
Responsiveness and Congruence
The gun control paradox seemingly violates the core ideal of democracy that the policies
enacted by government should reflect the desires of the populace. Because this ideal lies at the
heart of democratic governance, researchers have long sought to evaluate whether our
democratic institutions live up to it. The way that researchers have made this evaluation is
through analyzing the link between policy and public opinion. However, this research took some
time to emerge. Even though polling on political issues developed rapidly and became
widespread in the early 20th century, it took until the 1970s for scholars to use polling to
investigate this “opinion-policy link” (Martin 1984, 15–17; Shapiro 2011, 1985). Since then, by
comparing public opinion data to implemented policies, scholars have generated numerous
studies on government policy making to evaluate how democratic they are. To tackle the
question of a state gun control paradox, it is first necessary to make a conceptual distinction and
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definition of two concepts central to it: responsiveness and congruence. When reading literature
on this subject, this distinction is sometimes overlooked and the terms are even confused or
conflated, which is something to be avoided (Beyer and Hänni 2018, S14,S20).
The main reason that it is important to distinguish these two concepts is because they
have significantly different functions for evaluating democracy. Beyer and Hänni (2018) offer a
comprehensive overview and definition of the two concepts. Responsiveness measures causal
changes in opinion and policy over time, whereas congruence measures solely dyadic
relationships between policy and public opinion (S18). For example, a measurement of
responsiveness would record that it took two years for a policy to be implemented following the
time at which public support exceeded 50%. Congruence, in turn, measures the degree to which
government policy and public opinion on an issue are in agreement. These concepts examine
different relationships between government policy and public opinion. As Beyer and Hänni
describe, “responsiveness comes closer to the theoretical idea of representation while congruence
is more successful in assessing whether the majority gets what it wants” (2018, S15).
It should be emphasized, however, that although congruence and responsiveness are
distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. Beyer and Hänni argue that the opposite is true, as both
concepts are important for judging democratic regimes (2018, S15). Simply put, a government
that is both more responsive to and more congruent with public views is more democratic than
when not. Additionally, the authors emphasize that it is possible for governments to have one but
not the other; that is, have congruence but not responsiveness or vice versa (S37). For example,
“policy can move in the same direction as public opinion (responsiveness) without being in line
with majority will (congruence)” (S19). Therefore, a study seeking to evaluate an opinion-policy
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link needs to consider both congruence and responsiveness when devising data gathering
methods. Moreover, measuring one without the other can lead to conclusions that are misleading.
An Overview on the Opinion-Policy Link in the U.S.
The scholarly literature has used responsiveness and congruence calculations to produce
a sizable literature on the opinion-policy link. Perhaps the most pressing question that scholars
have investigated on this topic is the strength of the link between policy and opinion, which
ranges from a condition in which the public influences policy making to circumstances in which
policy is disconnected from opinion entirely. Reviewing the research on this question gives
insight into the way that opinion affects policy in the U.S., which is crucial to understanding the
gun control paradox. Reviewing this question will (1) reveal why circumstances like the gun
control paradox are not uncommon, and (2) identify the reasons for the existence of
circumstances like the gun control paradox.
Research on this question in the United States has provided evidence that the public’s
will exerts a modest influence over government policies in general. In his overview of the
literature on the opinion-policy link Public Opinion and American Democracy, Shapiro (2011)
concludes that “The above review of a sweeping range of research shows that public opinion
matters in policymaking in the United States (999).” He notes that several studies (e.g. Page and
Shapiro 1983; Monroe 1979) find that policy congruence rests at around 60% in the U.S.
Because this figure is greater than 50%, it indicates that there must be at least some influence of
public opinion over policy making, since it is higher than if the policies were picked at random
(991). Additionally, Shapiro addresses that the literature also indicates the government is
responsive in addition to this congruence (991). He references Page and Shapiro’s (1983)
research, which compared policy changes one year after changes in opinion. Their study found
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evidence for a causal connection between opinion and policy because the effects of opinion over
policy was much greater than the reverse effect, i.e., a change of policy after one year did not
have much impact on opinion, whereas a change in opinion did influence policy. Further
evidence for responsiveness found by Page and Shapiro’s (1983) research indicates that the
relationship between opinion changes and policy changes were stronger when said opinion
changes were greater and when issues were more salient. This suggests a causal relationship
between opinion and policy, since these increases are expected from legislators when responding
to opinion (Shapiro 2011, 991).
Democratic Performance Failures
Though this scholarly consensus does indicate that democracy is functioning, it also
reveals that its performance is not remarkable. Indeed, Shapiro says that “the strongest critique of
the opinion-policy studies is that the responsiveness that does occur is limited and incomplete”
(2011, 1000). The first failure Shapiro notes is that the ~60 percent congruence figure shows
that there are several issues (~40%) on which policy does not reflect opinion. He gives a few
examples of such issues, like some policy proposals from the 1950s, that enjoyed high support,
but remained unimplemented: term limits for senators, abolishing the electoral college, and
lowering the voting age. More recent and enduring examples that he cites are school prayer and
gun control. This evidence demonstrates that the gun control paradox and other such instances of
policy-opinion disconnection are not an uncommon occurrence. A second performance failure of
democracy Shapiro cites is when public opinion and policy move in the opposite directions, the
so-called “thermostat effect” (1001). This is when governments “overshoot” policy, i.e., the
government implements policy to adjust for public opinion to the degree that the public stops
supporting the policy.
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The most likely reason for these two democratic performance failures, Shapiro argues, is
the increased polarization and party-led politics in the country (1002). Parties, which often favor
the extremes of policy positions, “leapfrog” moderate changes in opinion by the public (Caughey
and Warshaw 2018). The other possible reasons Shapiro gives for these failures are unequal
responsiveness in favor of either those who are rich, economic elites, or actors with high political
participation. He cites the work of researchers who have found a considerable body of evidence
that demonstrates biases in responsiveness towards these groups (1002-1003).
Methodological Error?
Even the limited evidence of democratic function supported by the literature, however,
has been challenged—notably by Barabas (2016), who argues that a researcher’s reliance on
polling data is flawed because this data does not reflect a full policy agenda (438). He bases this
on the premise that issues with available polling data overrepresent issues with more salience
(441). To test this theory, Barabas examined a policy agenda created from analyzing issues
reported by The New York Times. Of the approximately 3000 issues found, only about 23 percent
corresponded with any polling data matched through an archive (445). This suggests that any
conclusions about responsiveness and congruence overall can only be made for policies salient
enough to garner polling data. For example, the Page and Shapiro (1983) study gets its 66%
congruence from 153 policy changes out of 231 instances (178). Barabas argues the denominator
of 231 instances likely does not reflect a full policy agenda (440-443). Barabas’ argument
demonstrates that Shapiro’s conclusions are not universal in the literature, and that studies should
take caution when making conclusions about the opinion-policy link using salient policies.
Regardless, the most pertinent finding of Shapiro’s review is that the connection between
opinion and policy, and therefore vitality of democracy, that scholars have found is incomplete.
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There are several issues to which the government is unresponsive to and/or its policies are
incongruent with public opinion. Gun control is one of them. Additionally, the hypothesized
reasons for this incompleteness (party polarization and unequal responsiveness) will prove useful
when reviewing the findings of this paper.
The Gun Control Paradox
As discussed, the gun control paradox is just one example of many issues in which there
exists a disconnection in the opinion-policy relationship. Fortunately, gun control is wellresearched in the scholarly literature, likely due to its salience. For this study, it will be crucial to
review the literature on the national gun control paradox for two reasons. For one, the
explanations of the national gun control paradox will serve as foundations on which to build any
explanations of similar configuration for state paradoxes. Second, the factors that make the gun
control paradox a special circumstance of non-congruence and non-responsiveness may also be
driving state paradoxes.
One factor that makes the gun control paradox such a unique case of policy-opinion
disconnection is its persistence. The issue of a gun control paradox has seen scholarly discussion
for half a century. The first scholarly work to record a disconnection between gun control
opinion and policy is The Polls: Gun Control by Erskine (1972), which reviewed survey data on
support for gun control from 1938-1972. Support for gun control during that time never dropped
below a two-thirds supermajority, which was measured through a variety of questions on
registering all pistols, police permits, and register all gun purchases (Erskine 1972, 457–59). This
suggests that the gun control paradox has been an issue for over eighty years. As Erskine argues,
“It is difficult to imagine any other issue on which Congress has been less responsive to public
sentiment” (1972, 456).
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Nonparticipation from Gun Control Supporters
Naturally, scholars were quick to investigate the reasons for this disconnect between
opinion and policy. The researchers who gave the “gun control paradox” its name, Schuman and
Presser (1977), suspected that instead of the paradox being caused by pressure groups or public
lack of information about legislative votes, it was instead caused by the inability of polling data
to show true sentiments of the public towards gun control (428). They test three hypotheses that
could prove this: (1) It is a matter of how the wording of polling questions create biases toward
pro-gun sentiment; (2) Pro-gun opinions are felt with greater intensity than anti-gun opinions;
and (3) Anti-gun opinions are held more by those with more political influence (1977, 429).
To test these hypotheses, the authors conducted surveys that asked several follow-up
questions after asking about the gun control policy of requiring police permits. Their results
found that question wording had little effect, and intensity among both pro-gun and anti-gun
respondents was similar (anti-gun was slightly higher). However, more pro-gun respondents held
the position that gun rights was for them an issue of the highest priority (1977, 434). Schuman
and Presser argue that these fervent pro-gun agents are more likely to act on their beliefs, i.e.,
write to congresspeople or contribute money, to block the passage of gun control legislation
(1977, 434–35).
Schuman and Presser followed up their research with a separate study, The AttitudeAction Connection and the Issue of Gun Control (1981), which surveyed respondents on the
intensity of their feelings for the issue of police gun permits and asked about self-reported
behavior based on those feelings (writing a letter, giving money, or both) (1981, 43). Their
results found that intensity was once again slightly higher in anti-gun respondents, but confirmed
their previous suspicions that action on feelings was significantly higher among pro-gun
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respondents (1981, 44). Furthermore, in 2013, Schuman and Presser re-examined the issue by
conducting another survey that asked respondents their actions taken. on gun control policy.
They found similar results, as opponents of gun control were more likely to have written and
given money to policymakers (2013, 69).
Factors of Nonparticipation
The book, Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America, furnishes an
in-depth explanation of the reasons for the inaction on the part of gun control supporters (Goss
2006). Goss names this problem (the same one evidenced in the work by Schuman and Presser)
as the “gun control participation paradox.” In the book, Goss explains why a movement for gun
control never materialized in the U.S., which she argues is the key factor for explaining the gun
control paradox (7). She attributes this absence to structural barriers that have prevented gun
control leaders from gaining access to crucial external resources to start a movement, and that
gun control leaders have mistakenly chosen strategies that are harmful to building a movement
(2006, 28). This explanation is consistent with Shapiro’s (1983) overview, as the low
responsiveness and congruence nationally indicates a systemic failure of the government policy
to be responsive/congruent with many specific issues.
Since the publication of Disarmed, other studies have uncovered evidence for other
factors that appear to contribute to the gun control paradox. Bouton et al. (2014) conducted a
study that found evidence that electoral incentives for members of Congress might discourage
enactment of gun regulation. They found that the likelihood for senators to vote against gun
regulation was correlated with how close they were to re-election. They also found that only
Democratic senators would change opinions on guns when they had a significant percentage of
gun control supporters within their constituency. The authors suggest that this indicates that the
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minority of voters who are pro-gun have an outsized impact on senatorial voting preferences,
especially during election years (28-30).
Aronow and Miller (2016) discovered through survey data that supporters of gun control
might have a misconception of current gun laws. That is, people do not know what current
national gun laws are and/or think that gun regulations are already in place. Their national survey
asked respondents if they thought universal background checks had been implemented, a
proposal supported by upwards of 75 percent of Americans. Forty-one percent stated that they
believed universal background checks were national policy even though this was not the case.
The authors suggest that this could contribute to lack of mobilization around gun control since a
significant number of supporters of the policy believed they had already been implemented
(223).
Another contributing factor to the gun control paradox, identified by the research of
Brennan, Lizotte, and McDowall (1993), is southern gun culture. Their study found evidence that
southerners, regardless of whether they owned a gun, were more likely to oppose stronger
regulations and handgun bans than in other regions. This would go a long way in explaining the
gun control paradox as it might mean that anti-control advocates are motivated by cultural
factors to get involved in political action.
Contrasting Evidence?
One somewhat contrasting response to the gun control paradox is voiced by Bordua
(1983), who argues that the polls that indicate high support for stronger gun control are flawed.
He does not disagree with the fact that support for gun control in the United States appears to be
very high (364–65). Rather, he presents evidence that the public does not actually support gun
control based on several surveys that show high support for opinions that are seemingly
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contradictory to gun control. For example, he argues polls instead indicate the public believes
gun control is ineffective against crime and that the public does not believe gun owners would be
willing to comply with gun control laws (348-350). He backs this polling evidence up by
referencing failed campaigns to implement gun control regulations in Massachusetts and
California. Despite the opposition (pro-gun) supporters vastly outspending the gun control
advocates in both campaigns, Bordua argues that the initiative’s failures still indicate the public’s
distaste for gun control because both had low turnouts (364).
Whereas the other scholarship reviewed here has argued that the public was seemingly
indifferent to the passage of gun control laws, Bordua’s argument is that the public does not want
gun control. Bordua’s conclusion is that the public (1) believes gun control is not a particularly
important issue; (2) guns are important for self-defense; and (3) gun control policies are
ineffective (1983, 355). As noted, Schuman and Presser found evidence against (1) salience
being a major factor in the gun control paradox, as salience was found to be slightly higher for
gun control supporters in all three of their studies (1977; 1981; 2013). With regards to points (2)
and (3), a response to can be found in Disarmed (2006). The author, Goss, says that arguments
such as (2) and (3) gained traction among the public due to failures on the part of gun control
leaders during the 1970’s who focused on handgun bans, which Goss argues obfuscated the goals
of the movement and led to effective attacks from the gun lobby (2006, 173–75). The two gun
control initiatives Bordua uses as evidence to support his hypothesis were, in fact, a handgun ban
in 1976 (MA) and a handgun registration law in 1982 (CA). This might suggest that the evidence
on which Bordua relies could be limited to that era of the gun control debate. Indeed, research by
Wolpert and Gimpel (1998) indicates handgun bans evoke stronger self-interest effects on public
opinion than other gun control regulations (256).
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The above works present many different reasons for the persistence of the gun control
paradox that are largely consistent with one another (excluding Bordua (1983)). When combined,
this scholarly consensus suggests that the gun control paradox is caused by the fact that gun
control supporters lack strong motivation to action and mobilization, while their anti-regulation
counterparts are mobilized, organized, and motivated. This lack of action on the part of gun
control supporters results from structural barriers, failures in judgment by gun control leaders,
misconceptions about gun laws, electoral incentives that discourage policy makers to enact
strong restrictions, and other similar factors. One thing to highlight about this consensus is that it
differs significantly from commonly held beliefs about the gun control paradox. As Goss
describes, “Whether one is at a dinner party or a scholarly meeting, all questions about gun
control politics seem to boil down to the same, three-letter answer: N-R-A (National Rifle
Association)” (Goss 2006, 22). While the NRA certainly plays a big part in the paradox, mostly
because the NRA has been extremely effective in persuading pro-gun advocates to put pressure
on members of Congress (Schuman and Presser 2013, 69; Wolpert and Gimpel 1998, 255), the
evidence indicates that the NRA is far from being the sole or even the foremost factor in
explaining the gun control paradox.
Responsiveness and Congruence in the States
There is a general consensus in the scholarly literature on the reasons behind the gun
control paradox in the context of the national government. However, this study focuses on
discovering if this paradox extends to states. To address this, this section reviews the literature
on the opinion-policy link in state gun control politics. First, this review of the literature on states
highlights differences between the opinion-policy link as manifested in state politics in
comparison to national gun control politics. Then, two methods that are used by researchers to
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estimate public opinion in the states are considered. Last, this section reviews some of the
evidence that points to a deficit in state congruence and other evidence that indicates the
existence of a state gun control paradox.
In contrast to the federal government, where large amounts of polling data on policy
preferences have been available for decades, polling on individual state’s public opinion is more
difficult to acquire. This is because, for one, national polls usually have a sample size that is too
small for the use of state samples within those surveys, and second, polling within individual
states is performed sparingly, and when it is, it is rarely done along with polling in other states
(Shapiro 2011, 997). Because of this scarcity of data, less sweeping and decisive conclusions can
be made about the research on the state responsiveness and congruence than on the federal level.
New research methods, however, are beginning to mine state data more effectively.
One method that researchers have used successfully to estimate state opinions is
disaggregation, which is the use of data from nationwide polls and separating their respondents
by state. Historically, there have been two issues associated with this method. The first is that
national polls usually do not have enough respondents to create sample sizes that are significant
enough for estimating the structure of public opinion for individual states. One way around this,
however, is to combine data from multiple years of national polling in order to increase the state
samples. The problem with this, in turn, is that changes in opinion cannot be measured using this
method. Recall that responsiveness requires measuring opinion changes and policy changes over
time. Thus, most research on state responsiveness lacks this crucial temporal dimension
necessary for measurement of democratic function (Lax and Phillips 2009a, 371; Caughey and
Warshaw 2018, 899). However, what these studies have been successful in doing is
demonstrating the effects of public opinion on state policy making in many policy areas, like
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abortion, gay rights, taxes and others (Shapiro 2011, 998). One study that does measure
responsiveness using disaggregation was conducted by Caughey and Warshaw (2018) employing
myriad national polls to measure “mass liberalism,” i.e., recording the leanings of state publics
when responding to policy questions. Their research found that states are responsive to changes
in mass liberalism overall, offering “reassurance regarding the health of American democracy”
(34). Additionally, the authors find that this responsiveness to mass liberalism has been gradual,
as “Large policy shifts are the result of the cumulation of incremental responsiveness over many
years” (4).
In recent years, researchers have also applied the method of multilevel regression and
poststratification (MRP) to estimate state public opinion. This method has been pioneered by Lax
and Philips to conduct research on state responsiveness and congruence (e.g. 2009a; 2012). A
very basic description of MRP is that it uses demographic data from state surveys in combination
with data about each demographic’s policy preferences to give an estimate of the state’s overall
opinion on the policy. Using this method, Lax and Phillips (2012) uncovered what they call a
“democratic deficit” in state congruence, as the policies they measured were congruent with
opinion less than 50 percent of the time, despite high responsiveness (153). They also tested
many hypotheses to explain this deficit, and found that higher salience, term limits, and
“professionalization” (the degree to which state legislators are career politicians) correlated the
most to higher congruence (164-165).
One other thread of research on states worth briefly mentioning is that on “direct
democracy” laws. These are programs which many states have implemented where citizens can
vote to pass policies without approval from the legislature. Indeed, it seems logical to suspect
that states with these laws might exhibit a higher level of congruence/responsiveness than states
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without them. However, research on whether these programs influence responsiveness and
congruence is very mixed, with many studies showing evidence on both sides (Simonovits,
Guess, and Nagler 2019, 407).
In summary, most scholars agree that the states generally exhibit a degree of
responsiveness to public opinion, similar to that of the national government, but research also
indicates that many policies are nonetheless incongruent with public opinion (Shapiro 2011,
999). A MRP-based study that illustrates this dynamic by Simonovits, Guess, and Nagler (2019)
found that while minimum wage laws responded to public opinion in the states, (i.e., when the
public wanted an increase, they got an increase) the minimum wage policies implemented were
on average $2.26 less than what the public favored. This failure on the part of state governments
to adopt policies favored by opinion might help explain at least in part a state gun control
paradox, just as the failure of federal government’s low congruence plays a part in the national
gun control paradox
A Gun Control Paradox in the States?
Gun control policy in individual states has been subjected to extensive research, however,
its relationship to public opinion has not been a part of this effort. This is largely because state
polling on the issue of gun control has historically been minimal. The only work that has directly
investigated the topic of a state gun control paradox is from Goss (2006) and is included in the
notes section of Disarmed. Because of the lack of reliable measurements of state gun control
support, she instead uses NRA membership obtained from magazine circulation figures. She then
compares these figures to the strength of state gun laws, obtained from the Open Society Institute
index (220-221). She concludes that “statistical analysis shows that state gun laws are far from a
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perfect reflection of citizen preferences,” (26) and finds that NRA membership only accounts for
18% of the variance in state gun laws (220).
While I hypothesize that Goss is correct in her assessment that state gun laws and public
opinion are weakly correlated, her methodology may not be appropriate for determining if a state
gun control paradox exists. First, as noted in the literature review, findings based solely on
responsiveness or congruence can lead to inaccurate portrayals of opinion-policy relationships.
Goss limits her research to a comparison of the congruence of aggregate policy to aggregate laws
in one year, 1999. This needs to be complemented by a comparison on changes in policy and
laws to changes (if any) in public opinion to show a full picture of their disconnection.
Second, using NRA membership might not reliably account for anticontrol sentiment.
The data gathered from national polls in this study finds support for loosening gun laws
nationwide from 2007-2019 has a mean of about 10%. Therefore, around 30 million Americans
oppose gun control. The NRA reported around 5 million members in 2019, according to their
own reporting (Gutowski 2019). Assuming these figures reflect those of 1999, NRA members
are a relatively small fraction (~15%) of pro-gun advocates in the country. For NRA membership
to be a reliable estimate of anticontrol opinion, distribution of NRA membership would have to
be reliably reflective of anticontrol opinion in each state.
Third, there are two important questions about state gun control paradoxes on which the
Goss study neglects to elaborate. One is recording which states have paradoxes. This is important
because if there exist any similar factors among states with paradoxes, a case can be made for
causal links between those factors and state paradoxes. Additionally, incongruence between
policy and opinion in certain states might indicate that citizens of those states are less likely to
act upon their beliefs about gun control. The second question is recording whether region and
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culture play important roles in the manifestation of state paradoxes. Evidence provided by
Brennan, Lizotte, and McDowall (1993) and Miller (2019) indicates that region and culture are
important factors in people’s attitudes towards gun control.
The paucity of research on the relationship between gun control policy and public
opinion at the state level provide ample justification for this study. Most importantly, however, at
the time of Goss’ study, there was little to no way to obtain polling data from the states,
especially about gun control (2006, 220). Today, there are two comprehensive ways to obtain
such data that have been developed: disaggregation and multilevel regression. These
developments alone warrant more comprehensive study of the gun control policy-opinion
linkages in the states.
Methodology
Disaggregation & MRP
This study uses the disaggregation of national polls to estimate public opinion on gun
control in six U.S. states. There are multiple factors that make disaggregation the right choice for
this study; however, it does have its drawbacks when compared with its competitor, MRP. The
main problem with disaggregation when making state opinion estimates has historically been the
lack of polling data. MRP, employed for state opinion estimation by scholars like Lax and
Philips (2009a; 2009b), hurdles this problem using demographic data that is more widely
available than standard polling. However, new resources have made standard polling much more
accessible, most notably by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
(https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/), which has made thousands of polls available for researchers
through their iPoll service. This increased availability makes using disaggregation a more viable
option for conducting a study like this one.
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While it may seem that one benefit disaggregation has over MRP is that it uses actual
polling data while MRP “simulates” it, this is likely not as advantageous as it might appear. Lax
and Philips (2009b) compared the two methods and found that MRP is more effective than
disaggregation when working with small and medium-sized samples for state-level data (120).
They conclude that MRP is the superior method when a high level of accuracy is required but
only a small amount of polling data exists for that policy. However, they also note that if the
level of accuracy required for the study is less, and the amount of polling data is sufficient,
polling of standard sizes (1000-2000 respondents) generates estimates for states that generally
reflect the structure of public opinion through disaggregation (120).
Based on this rationale, the most realistic option for this study is disaggregation because
polling data on gun control is abundant enough to satisfy the low requirements for accuracy that
the study’s question requires. This goal of this study, to find evidence for a state gun control
paradox, does not require extremely precise measurements of state opinion because evidence of
low congruence/responsiveness should be found with high margins of error. For example, a
measurement of 80% support for a gun control policy is more desirable than 52% support, since
80% support will nearly guarantee congruence/incongruence for that policy while 52% support
will not. Large margins like these are to be expected since similarly high support figures are
found for gun control policies nationally. Therefore, the decrease in margin of error from MRP is
not worth the additional hurdles that it poses to the research.
Polling Data
The polling data for this study was retrieved from the Roper Center’s iPoll service, which
hosts thousands of individual polls going back decades. However, there were filters that limited
the number of polls that could be used for this research. First, only polling data in which full

23

datasets were available from the Roper Center could be used, and second, each respondent’s state
needed to be recorded in all polls used, since it is required for disaggregation. Downloadable
datasets were only available for around half of questions (~1500/3000) relating to guns in
Roper’s Longstanding Methods Collection. However, a vast majority of these datasets (~90%)
did have respondent’s state listed.
Two different question types were collected from this pool of data. The first was to be
used for estimating congruence and the second for estimating responsiveness (although the
second type was eventually used for congruence, too). The first sort of question (Type I)
included those that directly related to a specific gun control policy. For example, questions in
this category were worded in the following fashion: “Would you support or oppose a policy that
did X?” or “Would you support the passage of X law?” Although wording was not entirely
consistent across the polls, there was enough similarity among questions of this type to make
comparisons across states. Almost all the questions allowed for 3 responses: “Support,”
“Oppose,” or “Unsure/Don’t Know,” with a handful dropping the latter option, although this had
little effect on support figures. Respondents from these questions were disaggregated by state
and placed into a dataset to calculate congruence and responsiveness. Though there were a total
of 13 different policies for which responses to questions were collected, only 6 had a significant
enough number of respondents over separate years to be used in the calculation of congruence.
These six policies were: assault weapons bans, universal background checks, preventing those
with a mental illness from purchasing firearms, banning high-capacity magazines, instituting a
gun purchases database, and arming teachers. It should be noted that arming teachers is not a
“gun control” proposal per say, however, it is related to gun control which is why it was
included. The proposal of arming teachers has largely been made by pro-gun advocates as a

24

contrasting policy option to gun control. Determining congruence to arming teachers will still
offer insights into overall gun control congruence because it should serve as a “negative” to the
gun control proposals. This is because it is expected to display low support whereas gun control
policies display high support.
The second type of question (Type II) used to calculate responsiveness consists of
questions that ask about respondent’s opinion on their desired strictness of gun control levels.
These questions were selected to estimate what is referred to as “policy mood,” which is the
public’s general feelings on gun control as a whole rather than their attitudes toward individual
policies (Beyer and Hänni 2018, S22–23). The question was usually worded such as: “Do you
think the laws covering the sale of guns should be more strict, less strict, or kept as they are
now?” Again, changes in wording had little effect on support levels for this question. This
question type was by far the most frequently asked of all gun control questions, with polling
available for every year between 2007-2019.
A total of 43 polls were used for the collection of responses to these questions. These
polls were mostly sponsored by media outlets but were in the main executed by survey-based
research organizations. Though I searched the collection of polling from the past two decades,
the available polls came from the 2007-2019 period. The decade of the 2010s represented a huge
increase in polling on gun control, reflecting its increased salience during that time. A table
showing each poll, research organization, and corresponding questions can be found in the
appendices (Table I).
State Selection Factors
Six states were selected to estimate public opinion on gun control. While disaggregating
the polling data for all 50 states would show a more detailed picture of state-level opinions, a
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small selection of states is enough to show the systematic disconnection between opinion and
policy that would be indicative of a state gun control paradox. However, this state selection had
to be significantly diversified to ensure that the data would not be skewed in any direction. To do
this, there were several factors were considered in the selection of states. (A chart listing each
state’s data for these factors can be found in the appendices, Table E)
Party Control – The six states were first selected on the basis of party control of the
legislature and governor’s offices over the past two decades. Two states were controlled almost
entirely by Democrats, two by Republicans, and two states split in party control these governing
institutions (see Table E). This was done based on the assumption that partisanship plays a large
role in the passage of gun control legislation and the gun control paradox.
Gun Ownership – States were selected to display a wide range of gun ownership in case
this was a factor for the gun control paradox.
Gun Regulation – The list was selected to reflect a wide range of states in terms of the
amount of gun regulation they have. Data on the stringency of gun laws were sourced by ratings
developed by the Giffords Law Center (https://giffords.org/).
Population – The selection reflected a diverse range of population sizes and a mix of
urban and rural populations.
Region – The selection includes states from all four U.S. Census regions (Northeast,
South, Midwest, West).
Calculating Congruence
Calculating congruence with the polling data was straightforward, as it simply compares
the support values of Type I questions with the state’s implementation/non-implementation of a
policy. For example, if the polling data shows 56% support for universal background checks, but
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the state does not have universal background checks, it is incongruent. If the state has
implemented background checks, then there is public opinion-policy congruence. However, there
were two complicating factors in determining congruence. The first complication has to do with
the margin of error (MOE). Each state had a different sample size which made the MOE
different for each year, with some years being much larger than others. One solution to this
problem is combining support from all the years to create a larger sample size and thus reduce
the MOE (this was done in Table A). However, determination of congruence for individual years
was also important to ensure that any findings from average years (Table A) were consistent. To
do this, Table B reports the number of congruent years from when MOE is under 8%, or if MOE
would not affect congruence value. Not affecting congruence value means, for example, if
Minnesota in 2011 recorded 65% support for a policy it has implemented with an MOE of 14%,
this MOE could not change the congruence value for that policy (congruent or not congruent),
since even if error is 14%, support would still be above 50%. In this case, 2011 would be
included on Table B (An unadjusted table is available in the Appendix of this paper, Table F).
The second complication in calculating congruence is determining when a policy is
congruent or not. For some of the polling questions, this was simple. For example, it is very easy
to determine whether a state has passed a universal background check law, assault weapons bans
or magazine restrictions. However, determining whether a state prevents the mentally ill from
purchasing guns or whether a state has instituted a gun control database is not as straightforward.
For mental illness bans, the problem is that it is technically illegal for mentally ill people to
possess firearms under federal law; however, the states differ on reporting when people are
considered mentally ill. Therefore, for this question, states were considered congruent when they
had laws that required reporting to the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check

27

System (NICS) in all three categories outlined by Giffords Law Center (which is used to
determine all state laws to calculate congruence). States with these restrictions essentially require
that all mentally ill people be reported to the NCIS, and subsequently will be unable to purchase
guns, which is what the polling question asks. In the case of “instituting a database to track gun
sales,” the issue is that no state has a “database” per say. However, some states do require that all
firearms sales are reported to law enforcement, which is what was used to determine congruence
to support for this question.
The last congruence calculation entails congruence of policy mood to policy grade (Table
C). The difference of each state’s support for implementing stricter gun policies (Type II) to
national support is compared with each state’s rank from Giffords Law Center. These ranks were
decided by recording changes in gun laws and ranking each state (1-50) for strictness of its gun
laws. Each state is also given a grade (A-F). Originally, congruence was assessed by the state’s
grade deviation from the middle rank, 25. However, because national support reflects the
country’s population rather than the states’, this proved to be inaccurate. The more accurate
assessment of congruence uses the state’s deviation from the middle rank of states graded C,
which was consistently around rank 14.
Calculating Responsiveness
Calculating responsiveness is more complex than congruence because it requires the
measurement of change in opinion. To calculate the responsiveness of the states to changes in
policy mood (using question Type II), the 10-year period of polling data in which Giffords Law
Center has recorded the rank of each state, 2010-2019, was employed. First, the change between
the 5-year averages of support at the start and end of the 10-year period (2010-2014 and 20142019) was measured. Second, the average ranks of each state for the same 5-year periods were
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then used to calculate their percent change in rank. Finally, the difference between these two
terms, change in rank versus change in support, was calculated. The lower the difference
between the change in rank against the change in support, the higher responsiveness the state
has. The use of 5-year averages was adopted instead of individual years because of the high
margin of error for individual years in the smaller states (CT, MN, and SC). According to
previous evidence, using these 5-year averages should not be a problem, as responsiveness in the
states has generally been evidenced to be a slow, gradual process (Caughey and Warshaw 2018).
One problem with this method is how to evaluate the comparison of change in rank to
change in opinion. Should we expect a one-to-one percentage change of rank to increases in
public support? For example, if the citizens of Connecticut increased their support of gun control
laws by 20 percent, should one expect to see a 20 percent increase in its rank from Giffords Law
Center? The answer is probably not, since these changes are not exactly correlated. This method
can, however, show that if Connecticut’s citizens increased their support for stricter gun laws by
20 percent, but Connecticut’s rank decreased by 20%. Data such as these indicate low
responsiveness. Additionally, we can look at comparisons with the other states. For example, if
California has very little difference between its change in rank and change in opinion but
Minnesota does, then it is probably true that California is more responsive than Minnesota.
Other Concerns
There are some other possible concerns with the methodology of this study that should be
reviewed. The first possible problem is that respondents to national polling questions might not
reflect opinions about the same questions in state polls. For example, some of the questions from
the polls used are worded, “Would you support or oppose that the federal government pass X
policy?” An issue could arise if people responded differently depending on if their state has
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passed the policy in question. This issue was addressed in Schuman and Presser’s (1983) study,
where they found that specifically asking a question using a federal indicator did not change
public opinion on the issue of gun registration (428). Their conclusion is reflected in this study’s
results, as there is very little variation in polling regardless of question wording. This should also
quell concerns about differences in question wording in general.
The second possible concern is that some states selected could be considered outliers
regarding gun control responsiveness and congruence. Indeed, in Goss' (2006) research on state
responsiveness, she argues that the states show low congruence after filtering out “a dozen or so
states that have particularly strong gun laws, or particularly weak ones” (221). Though her study
does not identify these states, I suspect that at least some of these states selected for this research
were considered outliers. However, the issue with filtering out these states is that most states
have extremely weak gun laws. According to Giffords Law Center’s 2020 gun law scorecard, 21
states received an F score, whereas only 8 received an A. Because of this, filtering out “outlier”
states on the ends of the spectrum might skew responsiveness and congruence lower than it is,
since it would remove a larger percentage of the states with stronger gun laws than lower
strength ones. Regardless, this outlier issue is likely the most concerning for this study because it
cannot be determined if any given state is an outlier without data from all other 50 states.
A third concern with the methodology is the problem that more salient policies might fail
to represent an entire policy agenda, a concern raised by Barabas (2016) in the context of
national responsiveness. This issue applies to the policy questions (Type I) of this study because
the selected policies from the polling data were the ones questioned the most. Therefore, these
questions likely fail to represent a full gun control agenda. As was seen in previous studies on the
opinion-policy link, issues with higher salience seemed to exhibit higher rates of responsiveness
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and congruence than issues with lower salience (Shapiro 2011, 991). Because of this, the results
of this study should be biased towards more responsiveness and congruence. However, this also
means that results that indicate low responsiveness/congruence would have overcome this
salience bias, which would reinforce evidence for a gun control paradox. Additionally, policy
mood congruence (Table C) likely better reflects a full gun control agenda.
Results
Congruence
As expected, the data gathered for this study generally shows very high support in all
states for individual gun control policies, with the exception being arming teachers (See
Appendix, Fig. A for details). What these results yielded is that a majority of states (4/6) show
incongruence with gun control policies because those states lack the gun control restrictions that
their publics support (Table A). Additionally, these results show that the national government is
incongruent with the same policies, consistent with a national gun control paradox. Only two
states, California and Connecticut, achieved more than half congruence with the six policies in
contrast to the other states. In fact, both states displayed high levels of congruence.
Table A: Congruence of All-Year Averages
CA
CT
MN
SC
TX
VA
Assault Ban
Y
Y
N
N*
Y*
N
Backgrnd Chk
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
MntlIllnessBan
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
HighCapLimit
Y
Y
N
N
N*
N
Database
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
ArmTeach
Y
Y
Y*
Y*
N*
Y*
TOTAL
2
6
5
1
1
1
2
% Congruent/6
33%
100%
83%
17%
17%
17%
33%
NAT = National/Federal Data *Congruence within MOE **Federal law relies on state mental health reporting
Source of Gun Policy for Congruence: Giffords Law Center
NAT
N
N
Y**
N
N
Y
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This incongruence from a majority of the states was also reflected in the congruence
calculation using individual years (Table B), where the only change was slightly higher
congruence being found in Texas and Virginia. California and Connecticut still displayed high
levels of congruence, and the National government is again mostly incongruent. Unadjusted
years saw little difference from this majority incongruence as well. Yet, we do find slightly
lower congruence in California and Connecticut and slightly higher congruence in the other
states in unadjusted years (Appendix, Table E). However, the change was not significant enough
to make any difference to the overall findings.

Assault Weapons Ban
Univ. Background Checks
Mental Illness Ban*
Magazine Limits
Gun Sale Database
Arming Teachers*
Total Congruent / Total Years
Congruent Years %

Table B: MOE Adjusted Congruent Years
NAT
CA
CT
MN
0
8
7
7
4
4
3
4
0
7
7
7
4
4
0
6
5
5
5
5
0
2
0
4
0
5
4
4
2
2
0
1
0
4
4
4
0
0
0
2
4
4
4
4
1
1
0
0
9 33
31 31
11 13
3 17
27%
100%
85%
18%

SC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
6
3
3
1
0
14
0%

TX
5
0
0
2
0
0
7

6
7
5
3
3
0
24
29%

VA
0
2
0
7
5
5
0
3
0
1
0
0
5 18
28%

Source of Gun Policy for Congruence: Giffords Law Center

Congruence of policy mood (Table C), however, tells a slightly different story than
congruence of individual policies. Support for generally stricter gun policies (question type 2)
was not as overwhelming as for individual policies in most states (See Appendix Fig. A).
California and Connecticut did not display a huge lead over the other states due to their
restrictive gun laws deviating from the average gun law grade more than their population’s
support deviated from the national average support. Minnesota and Virginia fared far better in
this calculation, as their middling grade ranks reflected the relatively average support held by
their populations for stricter gun policies. However, South Carolina and Texas both showed
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incongruence due to their populations having just under 50 percent support for more restrictive
gun policies yet deviating largely from the average grade.

CA
CT
MN
SC
TX
VA

Table C: Congruence with Policy Mood (Lower Difference = Higher Congruence)
% Population Dev. from
Avg. Gun
Rank
% Dev. from Difference
Support of
National
Law Rank
Difference
14
between
Stricter Gun
Support
(2010-2019)
from 14
Support &
Laws
(~50%)
(median)
Rank
59%
9%
1
13
26%
11%
67%
16%
2.75
11.25
22.5%
6.5%
53%
2%
12.625
1.3.75
2.75%
.75%
47%
-3%
29.75
-15.75
-31.5%
28.5%
46%
57%

-4%
7%

30.75
20.625

16.75
6.625

33.5%
13.25%

37.5%
6.25%

Dev = deviation. Source of Gun Policy for Congruence: Giffords Law Center

Responsiveness
The responsiveness figures of the six states suggest similar findings to the congruence
figures; that is, responsiveness was generally low (Table D). For the most part, support for
stricter gun policies during the 10-year period increased across all the states except Connecticut,
however, the states in which support increased the most did not generally see a corresponding
increase in rank, indicating low responsiveness. We still see significant variation among the
states, the same variation as seen in the congruence figures, with California and Connecticut
displaying the highest congruence. However, the responsiveness differences between the states
are not as pronounced. This could be because change in gun law ranking is a relatively rare
occurrence. For example, California never lost its spot as the number one ranked state in the
country during the entire 10-year period. In contrast, change in support seems to be more easily
moved, fluctuating every year by a few percentage points. Still, there seemed to be very little
connection between the two figures of change in rank and change in support, indicating
discordance between the public’s mood towards gun control and lawmaker’s actions.
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Table D: Difference in Rank Change to Support Change (Lower Difference = Higher Responsiveness)
CA
CT
MN
SC
TX
VA
Change in Rank between 5 yr. Average Ranks
0
0
0.25
0
-5.5
-3.25
% Change in Rank out of 50
0%
0%
1%
0%
-11%
-7%
Change between 5 yr. Avg. Support Figures
9%
-4%
17%
27%
14%
8%
Rank Chng and Support Chng Difference
9%
4%
17%
27%
25%
15%
*See Appendix Tables G & H for specific rank & support figures over the 5-year periods
Source of Gun Law Grade: Giffords Law Center

Conclusions
The evidence derived from the disaggregation of national polling data on gun control
indicates that it is likely that a gun control paradox exists in most states. This is because, for one,
a majority of the six states investigated show a disconnection between their public’s opinion on
gun control policies and their gun control laws, indicating low congruence of state governments
to gun control. Second, a majority of the six states also showed low responsiveness to changes in
support for stricter gun policies not affecting changes in gun policy.
The evidence shows that California and Connecticut have high congruence and
responsiveness to gun control policies, certainly more than their counterparts in this study.
However, it would be wrong to think that this indicates that many or most states display similar
attributes. Most states are like the four incongruent/less responsive cases from this study because
most states have not implemented the gun control policies that the public supports. Recall that 21
states scored an F in the Giffords Law Center grading, meaning more than 40 percent of states
have similar gun laws to South Carolina and Texas (both scored Fs), and likely have similar
congruence and responsiveness figures as well. Only additional research on all 50 states can
confirm this inference, however.
Regarding the scholarly literature, the evidence from this study generally fits with
previous research, however, there are some slight deviations. On the surface, the results of Table
C appear to contradict the results of Goss’ (2006) study, since it records that 4/6 states had
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decent congruence with policy mood, whereas Goss’ study found that congruence with policy
mood was generally low (220-221). There are two reasons that might explain why the results of
the two studies are more similar than it seems. The first is once again that most states probably
reflect South Carolina and Texas’ results for the same reasons noted. Second, Goss’ study
removed outliers, possibly skewing her results towards less congruence. For these reasons, it is
likely that policy mood congruence is low in most states, though more research is required to
confirm this.
This study does expand on Goss’ findings by testing the congruence of individual gun
control policies (Tables A & B). The evidence demonstrated that certain states (California and
Connecticut) displayed much higher congruence on individual policies than others. The most
likely reason for this difference in congruence (between Tables A/B and C) likely stems from the
fact that the policies tested in Tables A and B represent salient gun control policies, whereas
policy mood represents all policies. Salient policies, as evidenced by the work of Page and
Shapiro (1983) and Lax and Phillips (2012), are more likely to be congruent to public opinion.
This would also corroborate Barabas' (2016) arguments that such salient policies cannot be used
to reflect a full gun control agenda.
This study also expands upon Goss’ (2006) research by showing that most states generally
exhibit low responsiveness to gun control in addition to low congruence. This is especially
crucial evidence for the gun control paradox in the states because congruence only tells half of
the story, as governments can have congruence but low responsiveness (Beyer and Hänni 2018).
Indeed, obtaining data on opinions for both is even more necessary in state research because
states have been shown to exhibit a deficit in congruence while having high responsiveness (Lax
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and Phillips 2012). This study shows that a situation of low congruence/high responsiveness is
not the case regarding gun control.
As for the reasons for the state gun control paradox, this study’s evidence is consistent
with most of the explanations for the national gun control paradox but cannot confirm that they
are in effect. The best evidence from this study for the main explanation of the gun control
paradox, that gun control supporters are lacking in political action, comes from the results in
California and Connecticut. This is because, according to Goss (2006), gun control advocates did
have success in “a small handful of states,” like California and Connecticut (10). Other than that,
more research would be needed to confirm this main explanation, such as disaggregating polling
on political action like those from Schuman and Presser's (2013; 1981) research.
As for the other factors for the national paradox, the data is again largely consistent with
them, but not confirming. The southern states of the study (SC, TX, & VA) exhibit less
congruence and responsiveness than the others. This could be seen as evidence towards Brennan,
Lizotte, and McDowall's (1993) conclusions, especially since Minnesota, the state with the
highest rates of gun ownership of all six states, displays far more congruence and responsiveness
than the southern states. The difference in support for individual policies of gun control versus
support for generally stricter gun laws (Appendix, Fig. A) could be seen as evidence for Aronow
and Miller's (2016) hypothesis that people have misconceptions about which gun laws are
already implemented. The fact that the two completely Democrat-controlled states (CA and CT)
were the only ones that were congruent with salient gun control policies is consistent with the
study from Bouton et al. (2014), which found that only Democratic representatives would change
their position on gun control. This last point also reflects the findings of Shapiro's (2011)
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argument that political polarization, unequal responsiveness, and the “thermostat effect”
contribute to instances of opinion-policy discordance.
Further Research
Further research on the state gun control paradox can improve upon the findings of this paper
in two ways. First, new studies should be more extensive and detailed. All fifty states should be
included, and more policies should be researched. This would likely necessitate the use of MRP.
That is, while polling data on gun control is more extensive than in most policy fields, it is not as
extensive as such comprehensive research would require. One reason that this increased detail is
important is to determine whether most states exhibit low responsiveness and congruence to gun
control. While the evidence from this paper does suggest that this is the case, there is still a
possibility that the states used were outliers and that most states display congruence and/or
responsiveness. Second, the reasons for the state gun control paradox should be tested. While the
explanations for the state gun control paradox most likely reflect the reasons for the national gun
control paradox, this is not certain, as individual states can present significantly different
political dynamics in comparison to the national government. This can be done in many ways,
such as, as suggested, disaggregation of polling that asks about respondent’s actions towards gun
control.
Lastly, polling within individual states should be greatly expanded. While resources like the
Roper Center are huge improvements over what was available in the past, there still exists an
appreciable scarcity of data. This seriously limits the amount of research that can be done on
states, as methods to estimate state data such as MRP are resource intensive. State laws vary
immensely, and not just in the field of gun control. Because of this variation, determining the
responsiveness and congruence of state governments is incredibly important. State governments
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are arguably “closer” to the people, making understanding their congruence and responsiveness
dynamics crucial to research on the opinion-policy link.
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Appendix
Fig. A. Support Levels
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Table E: State Selection Factors (Continues on next page)
Party Control (2000-2020) (Gov, Upper,
Gun
Reg.
Population
Lower)
Ownership
Grade
18%
A
37.2M

Urban
Pop.%
95

TX

37%

F

25.1M

84.7

VA

37%

B

7M

75.5

CT

18%

A-

3.4M

87.7

MN

42.8%

C+

4.9M

70.9

SC

49.4%

F

4.6M

66.3
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Sources: Party Control: https://ballotpedia.org/, Ownership: RAND Corporation (Schell et al. 2020), Grade:
Giffords Law Center (https://giffords.org/), Population: 2010 U.S. Census. Reg=Gun Regulation
Table F – Unadjusted Congruent Years
Nat

CA

CT

MN

SC

TX

VA

Assault Weapons Ban

0

8

7

8

7

8

6

8

5

8

6

8

2

8

Univ. Background Checks

0

7

7

7

7

7

0

7

0

7

0

7

0

7

Mental Illness Ban*

5

5

0

5

0

5

0

5

0

5

0

5

5

5

Magazine Limits

0

4

4

4

4

4

0

4

0

4

2

4

0

4

Gun Sale Database

0

4

4

4

4

4

0

4

0

4

0

4

0

4

Arming Teachers*

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

0

4

4

4

Total Congruent / Total Years

9

32

26

32

26

32

10

32

9

32

8

32

11

32

Congruent Years %

Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Sum
2010-14
Sum201
5-19
2010-14
Avg
2015-19
Avg
Diff 5
Yr Avg

28%

CA
45
236
188
254
81
73
69
243
187
53
804
625
0.56302
5
0.65582
4
9%

Year

CA
2010
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

139
398
325
429
137
121
112
377
250
93
142
8
953
0.0
3
0.0
3

81%

81%

31%

Table G. 5 Year Average Support Change
CT
MN
SC
4
14
9
35
4
21
29
39
37
77
30
61
30
47
35
77
21
62
65
79
61 110
31
74
8
14
19
40
11
29
12
15
7
14
8
15
10
14
16
21
12
18
12
28
39
62
27
41
16
21
24
36
19
27
8
9
20
31
10
14
136 193
161 339
97 247

28%

25%

TX

34%

VA
29
89
72
130
54
15
39
125
68
32
374

106
215
179
307
100
21
73
235
113
61
907

19
69
100
145
19
28
20
47
41
12
352

51
126
162
258
42
45
32
82
58
17
639

58

87

106

164

76

115

279

503

148

234

0.70466
3
0.66666
7
-4%

0.0
7
0.1
1

0.47492
6
0.64634
1
17%

0.0
5
0.0
8

0.39271
3
0.66087

0.0
6
0.0
9

0.41234
8
0.55467
2
14%

0.0
3
0.0
4

0.55086
1
0.63247
9
8%

0.0
4
0.0
6

27%

Table H. 5 Year Average Rank Change (Continues on next page)
CT
MN
SC
TX
1
5
15
23
1
2
12
34
1
2
12
34
1
2
12
28
1
2
12
29
1
3
12
29
1
3
13
30
1
3
13
31

VA
19
31
29
33
34
32
34
34

16
20
20
20
21
20
22
26

40
Average
2010-14 Avg
2015-19 Avg
Diff. 5 Yr Avg

1
1
1
0

2.75
2.75
2.75
0

12.625
12.75
12.5
0.25

29.75
29.75
29.75
0

30.75
28
33.5
-5.5

20.625
19
22.25
-3.25

Source: Rank is from Giffords Law Center Annual Scorecards
Table I: Polls Used (Continues on next page)
Poll Name

Year

Question/s

Survey Organization

Roper ID

NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll:
December 2019
NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll:
September 2019 Gun Violence
NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll:
February 2019 Gun Violence

2019

Background, AssaultBan

31116969

2019

NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll: July
2019
ABC News/Washington Post Poll:
Trump/2020 Presidential Election/Gun
Control
ABC News/Washington Post Poll:
Trump/Gun Laws/Russia
Associated Press-NORC Center for
Public Affairs Research Poll: The March
2018 AP-NORC Center Poll
CNN Poll: February 2018 - Poll 3

2019

Background, AssaultBan,
ArmTeachers, MagLimit
Strictness, Background,
ArmTeachers, AssaultBan, Database,
MentalIllnessBan, HighCapacityBan
Background, AssaultBan

Marist College Institute for
Public Opinion
Marist College Institute for
Public Opinion
Marist College Institute for
Public Opinion

31116608

2019

Background, AssaultBan, MagLimit

Marist College Institute for
Public Opinion
Langer Research Associates

2019

AssaultBan

Langer Research Associates

31114983

2018

Strictness, Background, AssaultBan,
ArmTeachers, MentalIllnessBan

31114955

2018

CBS News Poll: February 2018

2018

AssaultBan, MagLimit,
MentalIllnessBan
Strictness, AssaultBan, ArmTeachers

The Associated Press-NORC
Center for Public Affairs
Research
SSRS (Social Science Research
Solutions)
SSRS

Associated Press-NORC Center for
Public Affairs Research Poll: Gun Laws,
Ownership, and Violence in America
CBS News Poll: Trump/Health
Care/Border Wall
CNN Poll: October 2017 - Poll 10

2017

Strictness

31114585

2017

Strictness

The Associated Press-NORC
Center for Public Affairs
Research
SSRS

2017

Strictness, AssaultBan, MagLimit

SSRS

31114550

CBS News Poll: December 2017

2017

SSRS

31114736

CBS News Poll: Terrorism/Gun Control
Laws/Orlando Nightclub Shooting
Pew Research Center: August 2016
Political Survey
CNN/ORC Poll: 2016 Presidential
Election/ Gun Control Laws/ Acts of
Terrorism in the United States
CBS News/New York Times Poll: 2016
Presidential Campaign/Gun
Laws/Planned Parenthood
Pew Research Center: July 2015 Political
Survey
CBS News/New York Times Poll:
Political Parties/National Issues
CBS News/60 Minutes/Vanity Fair Poll:
Various Issues
CBS News Poll:
Economy/Sequester/Same-Sex Marriage
CBS News Poll: Barack Obama

2016

Background, AssaultBan,
ArmTeachers
Strictness

SSRS

31102968

Background, AssaultBan, Database,
MagLimit
Background, AssaultBan, MagLimit,
MentalIllnessBan

Princeton Survey Research
Associates International
Opinion Research Corporation

31096310

2016

Strictness

SSRS

31091610

2015

Princeton Survey Research
Associates International
SSRS

31096290

2014

Background, AssaultBan, Database,
MentallIllnessBan
Strictness

2013

Strictness

CBS News

31091063

2013

Strictness

CBS News

31091061

2013

Strictness

CBS News

31091059

CBS News/New York Times Poll:
Economy/Government/Gun Control
Pew Research Center Poll: May 2013
Political Survey
CBS News/New York Times Poll:
Obama and the Republicans in
Congress/Gun Control/Syria

2013

Strictness

CBS News; New York Times

31091589

2013

Background, AssaultBan,
ArmTeachers, Database
Strictness, Background, AssaultBan

Princeton Survey Research
Associates International
CBS News; New York Times

31096193

2019

2016
2016

2013

31116763
31116083

31116757

31114892
31115726

31114313

31095605

31091596

31091591

41
CNN/ORC Poll: Obama/Gun Control

Opinion Research Corporation

31095547

CBS News Poll: Politics/Federal
2012 Strictness
CBS News
Budget/Life
CBS News/60 Minutes/Vanity Fair Poll:
2012 Strictness
CBS News
Driving and Cost of Gas/Mother's
Day/Life
Time Magazine/Abt SRBI Poll:
2011 Strictness
Abt SRBI, Inc. (Schulman,
Constitution
Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc.)
CBS News/New York Times Poll:
2011 Strictness
CBS News; New York Times
Government/Economy/Budget/Healthcar
e Reform
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll:
2011 Strictness
Hart and McInturff Research
America's Future/2012 Presidential
Companies
Election/Tucson Shootings
CBS News Poll: Gun Control/Arizona
2011 Strictness
CBS News
Shooting
USA Today/Gallup Poll: December
2011 Strictness, Background, AssaultBan,
Gallup Organization
Wave 2--Gun Control/Newtown School
MagLimit
Shooting/Travel Plans/Sports/Religion
CNN/ORC Poll: Obama/Gun
2011 Background, AssaultBan, MagLimit
Opinion Research Corporation
Control/Economy/Arizona Shooting
ABC News/Washington Post Poll:
2011 AssaultBan, MagLimit
Langer Research
January Monthly--Barack Obama/Tucson
Associates; TNS Intersearch
Shooting/Health Care Reform/Gun
Control
CBS News/New York Times Poll:
2010 Strictness
CBS News; New York Times
Government/Tea Party Movement
CNN/ORC Poll # 2009-006:
2009 Strictness
Opinion Research Corporation
Economy/International Relations
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll:
2009 AssaultBan
Hart and McInturff Research
October, 2009--Barack Obama/Health
Companies
Care Reform
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll:
2009 AssaultBan
Hart and McInturff Research
April, 2009--Barack Obama
Companies
USA Today/Gallup Poll # 2008-09: Post2008 Strictness
Gallup Organization
Super Tuesday Poll
CNN/ORC Poll # 2008-007: 2008
2008 MentalIllnessBan
Opinion Research Corporation
Presidential Election/Price of
Gasoline/Gun Control
CBS News/New York Times Poll:
2007 Strictness
CBS News; New York Times
Environment
Associated Press/Ipsos Public Affairs
2007 Strictness
Ipsos-Public Affairs
Poll: Gun Control
DOI link to polls is: https://doi.roper.center/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-__________ (Roper ID fills blank)
Access to further data from the polls used in this study can be found at https://www.williamrose.net/

2013

Strictness

31091057
31091050

31097943
31091564

31094896

31091030
31089824

31095481
31086989

31091558
31095450
31094884

31094880
31089685
31095428

31091531
31090106
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